Yang’s (2016) Tolerance Principle describes with incredible precision how many exceptions the mechanisms of child language acquisition can tolerate to induce a productive rule, and, as I pointed out in a previous post, it is a notable advance in the long-standing controversy as to the amount of data necessary for the acquisition of language. This … Continue reading Two types of linguistic theory, two conceptions of language
Of course, simply to formulate the question above as such already implies that biolinguistics is a kind of linguistics. And indeed, this is the idea I want to address: that biolinguistics is a kind of linguistics. What this means is that I do not see biolinguistics as a mixture of biology and linguistics or as … Continue reading What Kind of Linguistics is Biolinguistics?
In a commendable and sincere self-portrait, linguist Gillian Ramchand explains what it means for her to be a generativist linguist. Among the many things that she thinks you can accept while being Chomskyan is having no reason to think that Jackendoff is crazy. I completely agree. Contrary to what other (quite orthodox) generativists seem to … Continue reading Jackendoff is not crazy! (Or about phonology and consciousness)
One of the most notable theoretical physicists of the twentieth century, Erwin Schrödinger, considered it “obvious” that there is only one human consciousness, and that the feeling of having an individual mind is just that, a feeling (Schrödinger 1944). With all due respect to the father of the wave equation of quantum mechanics (for which … Continue reading Two languages, two minds? Horrifying Schrödinger
Some linguists are envious of physics. We love showing off to other practitioners of the so-called humanities how we can make our field an empirical natural science that uses the hypothetico-deductive method. But, at the same time, we know that things in linguistics (as usually happens in cognitive sciences) are very different from how they … Continue reading An equation for Plato’s problem
According to Martin Haspelmath (in a recent blogpost), differential object marking (DOM) “has been well-understood since the 1980s, but even though the explanation was clearly stated in Comrie (1989) (and also formulated clearly in Croft (1988) and Bossong (1991)), many linguists seems to have forgotten about it”. Haspelmath’s main thesis in this piece is that … Continue reading What does it mean to understand Differential Object Marking? A Reply to Haspelmath